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1. Introduction  
Letter volumes in countries with advanced postal networks have been in decline for many years and 
generating increasing pressure on postal universal service providers (USPs) to seek new revenue 
streams and increase efficiency to meet their regulatory and financial obligations. The increase in on-
line shopping over the past decade and associated increased demand for parcels has provided postal 
USPs with a much needed boost to counter balance some of the challenges they are confronting. 
However, as the parcel market expands and evolves to meet changes in consumer patterns this brings 
forward new threats as well as opportunities for USPs. For example, while competition in some parts 
of the parcels market is already quite intense, especially the domestic bulk contract segments within 
some European countries, USPs face the threat of increasing competition in the single piece or non-
contract parcel segment, especially from competitors that may potentially be operating at the margin 
of regulatory requirements. In particular, private individuals and small businesses, both of whom have 
traditionally sent parcels via USP Post Office outlets, are being offered an increasing range of options 
to send them via other parcel operators using alternative acceptance points, such as local convenience 
stores, retail outlets and locker banks.  
The growth in on-line shopping therefore provides USPs with an opportunity to compete for 
higher parcel volumes but also poses a threat to elements of their traditional unique selling point via 
increasing competition to Post Office outlets. This paper develops and calibrates a theoretical model 
to assess the extent to which these two effects impact USPs’ finances and the trade-offs they face 
between efficiency gains and pricing when operating within a regulatory framework. It builds on the 
model developed by De Donder et al. (2018), where a USP operates in several postal markets (single 
piece mail, bulk letters and bulk contract parcels) and faces direct competition in the latter two 
markets. The USP is assumed to maximize profits over two periods during which it is subject to 
regulatory constraints and changing market conditions. The current paper extends that model and the 
existing literature by introducing competition for non-contract parcels. More precisely, the single-
piece mail market is disaggregated into single piece letters (SPL), where the USP does not face any 
competition from other postal operators, and single piece parcels (SPP), where the USP faces 
increasing competition from private, profit-maximizing parcel operators. This added dimension 
increases the tensions being managed by the USP to achieve a feasible rate of efficiency and deliver a 
normal economic rate of return. Furthermore, increasing competition in the parcels market creates 
added uncertainty for the regulator in terms of setting price controls on the USP.  
 Section 2 outlines the model and in particular the extension to that developed by De Donder et 
al. (2018). Section 3 calibrates and applies the model to consider the tensions and trade-offs 
associated with the USP achieving different levels of efficiency under different degrees of 
competition in the SPP market. Section 4 reports sensitivities while Section 5 concludes and an 
appendix provides further details on the calibration of the model.  
                                                            
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
organisations to which they are affiliated. 
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2. The Model  
 
2.1 Operators and Markets 
 
The model developed in this paper extends the one presented in De Donder et al. (2018) (referred to 
as DRS henceforth) by modelling explicitly and separately the single-piece letters and single-piece 
parcels markets, which were previously merged under the heading “single-piece mail”. In order for 
this paper to be self-contained, a full description of the analytical model is provided below. 
There are two types of postal operators: a USP, denoted by , and a set of competitors, 
denoted by . There are five postal services: single-piece letters (SPL), bulk letters (BL), an access 
service for delivery of competitors’ BL through the USP’s network, single-piece parcels (SPP) and 
contract parcels (CP). In addition, there are two delivery areas in each postal market, urban (U) and 
rural (R). Each of the five postal markets is described sequentially, starting with the letters markets. 
 
2.2 Single-piece letters (SPL) 
 
The USP is subject to a USO to provide an SPL service of a given quality delivering at the same price 
to all addresses in both delivery areas. The USP enjoys a de facto monopoly on the SPL market as 
competitors do not find it profitable to offer an SPL service with these features. 
The net utility that consumers in zone  obtain from consuming quantity  of SPL at 
unit price  is denoted by  The demand function for SPL in zone  is obtained by 
maximizing utility with respect to , and is denoted by . Utility is quadratic in quantities, so that 
the demand function is linear and of the form ݔ݅ሺ݌ሻ ൌ ߙ െ ߚ݌. The unit variable cost for SPL is 
denoted by . The contribution to USP profit of SPL in zone  is then . Note that the 
USP also faces a global fixed cost in order to meet the USO in all postal markets. 
 
2.3 Bulk letters (BL) 
 
The USP faces competition in the BL, SPP and CP markets. Competition in the former can be end-to-
end (E2E) or through access, with the USP selling both an E2E BL product to final consumers and an 
access service to competitors. In the case of access, each unit of competitors’ BL requires one unit of 
access to the USP delivery network. The BL products offered by both operators are imperfect 
substitutes, whether the competitor uses access or bypasses the USP delivery network. Competitors 
then choose the cheapest way to deliver BL traffic (i.e., they offer an E2E product if the access charge 
is larger than their own delivery cost, and access the USP delivery network otherwise).  
 The net utility obtained by consumers in zone  from consuming BL is 
 where  denotes the consumer price operator  posts in zone 
, and  the quantity consumed of that good. The demand for goods in each zone is obtained by 
maximizing consumers’ utility, and is denoted by  and . Note that both 
operators’ prices influence demand for both goods, because the function  is non separable in  
and . The utility function  is quadratic in quantities, so that BL demand functions are linear in 
prices.  
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 As for BL costs,  denotes operator ’s (constant) marginal delivery cost in zone , and  
operator ’s upstream constant unit cost in zone . The competitors charge an exogenous mark-up ݉௅ா  
over their marginal cost in both cases whose level reflects the intensity of competition on the market. 
If the access charge  is smaller than the competitor’s delivery cost , the competitor chooses to 
access the USP’s delivery network in zone  and charges a price . If 
, the competitor prefers to offer an E2E product in zone , whose price is . 
The contribution to USP’s profit of BL in zone  is given by
, in the access case, and by 
 in the bypass case. 
 
2.4 Contract Parcels (CP) 
 
Competition on the SPP and CP markets is of the E2E variety only. CP products sold by the USP and 
competitors are imperfect substitutes and there is no substitution between CP and SPP. 
The net utility obtained by consumers in zone  from consuming CP is 
 where  denotes the consumer price operator  posts in zone , 
and  the quantity consumed of that good. The demand for goods in each zone is obtained by 
maximizing the consumers’ utility, and is denoted by and . Note that both 
operators’ prices influence demand for both goods, because the function  is non separable in  
and . The utility function  is quadratic in quantities, so that CP demand functions are linear in 
prices.  
The constant unit variable cost for CP for operator  in zone  is denoted by . There is no 
need to distinguish upstream and downstream costs as no access is provided for this good. 
Competitors charge an exogenous mark-up ݉௉	ா over their marginal costs: . 
The contribution of CP to the USP’s profit is ൫ݏ௜ூ െ ௜݂ூ൯ݖ௜ூሺݏ௜ூ, ݏ௜ாሻ.  
 
2.5 Single-piece parcels (SPP) 
 
Competition in the SPP market is of the E2E variety, as in the CP market, but with two caveats. First, 
both the USP and competitors are assumed to post a uniform price in U and R. Second, consumers are 
assumed to bear a cost, beyond the price charged, to use the competitors' product. This cost reflects 
the fact that the density of contact points is, initially, lower for the competitors than for the USP. This 
user cost is borne by the sender of SPP and is additional to that incurred to use the USP’s SPP service. 
In addition, the USP is meeting its USO obligations and, similar to SPL traffic, is obliged to provide a 
service of a given quality. 
The amount of SPP sent to area i={U,R} by using the services of operator j is denoted by ݔௌ௉,௜௝ . 
Operator j charges the unit price ݌ௌ௉௝  for this good and the unit variable cost in area i for operator j is  
ܿௌ௉,௜௝ . As for the (time and transportation) costs borne directly by senders, these are normalized to zero 
when using the USP's services, and denoted by cu for the additional cost senders bear in using 
competitors’ products.  
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The net utility obtained by consumers in zone  from consuming SPP is ݓ௜ௌ൫ݔௌ௉,௜ூ , ݔௌ௉,௜ா ൯ െ
݌ௌ௉ூ ݔௌ௉,௜ூ െ ሺ݌ௌ௉ா ൅ ܿݑሻݔௌ௉,௜ா . The demand for goods in each zone is obtained by maximizing the 
consumers’ utility, and is denoted by ݔௌ௉,௜ூ ሺ݌ௌ௉ூ , ݌ௌ௉ா ൅ ܿݑሻ and ݔௌ௉,௜ா ሺ݌ௌ௉ூ , ݌ௌ௉ா ൅ ܿݑሻ. The contribution 
of SPP to the USP’s profit is ൫݌ௌ௉ூ െ ܿௌ௉,௜ூ ൯ݔௌ௉,௜ூ ሺ݌ௌ௉ூ , ݌ௌ௉ா ൅ ܿݑሻ.  
Entrants are assumed to post the mark-up ݉ௌ௉ over their average variable costs when setting 
their uniform price: 
݌ௌ௉ா ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݉ௌ௉ሻ ቈ
ݔௌ௉,௎ா
ݔௌ௉,௎ா ൅ ݔௌ௉,ோா ܿௌ௉,௎
ா ൅ ݔௌ௉,ோ
ா
ݔௌ௉,௎ா ൅ ݔௌ௉,ோா ܿௌ௉,ோ
ா ቉ 
  
2.6 Pricing and regulation 
 
The pricing behaviour of the competitors has been described in the four sub-sections above, and 
consists in posting specific mark-ups over variable costs. These mark-ups represent proxies for the 
degree of competition in each of the postal submarkets. The USP chooses the level of its prices 
(݌, ݍ௜ூ, ݏ௜ூ, ݌ௌ௉ூ ) in order to maximize its profit, subject to the following constraints.  
First, the regulator sets caps on the USP’s SPL and the SPP prices, which contain the same 
mark-up ݉ௌ௉ோ  over variable costs:  
݌ ൑ ሺ1 ൅ ݉ௌ௉ோ ሻ ቈ ݔ௎ݔ௎ ൅ ݔோ
ܿ௎ ൅ ݔோݔ௎ ൅ ݔோ
ܿோ ቉, 
 
݌ௌ௉ூ ൑ ሺ1 ൅ ݉ௌ௉ோ ሻ ቈ ݔௌ௉,௎
ூ
ݔௌ௉,௎ூ ൅ ݔௌ௉,ோூ ܿௌ௉,௎
ூ ൅ ݔௌ௉,ோ
ூ
ݔௌ௉,௎ூ ൅ ݔௌ௉,ோூ ܿௌ௉,ோ
ூ ቉. 
 
Second, the access charge in the BL market is set by the regulator such that 
, as applied in the numerical simulations in this paper, and passes a margin squeeze 
constraint: the difference between the USP’s BL price an access charge, in any zone i, must be at least 
equal to the upstream costs of the USP in the zone: (1 ),I Ii i iq a b      where ϕ is the mark-up over 
upstream costs. Third, the difference between the (higher) SPL price ݌ and the USP’s (lower) BL 
price ݍ௜ூ, in each zone, must be greater than the upstream preparation cost of the USP’s BL final 
customers, ܾ௣: , .  
Finally, note that the regulator sets the value of  ݉ௌ௉ோ   so that the USP makes a normal rate of 
return (that is, it achieves zero economic profit and the margin made by selling all five types of 
services exactly covers the fixed cost F of the USP). The regulator's primary objective is to ensure the 
USP is able to provide universal service on a continuing basis while allowing it to earn zero economic 
profit. In order to achieve this aim it is assumed that the regulator sets the SPL and SPP price caps 
using the same equi-proportionate mark-up on variable costs, ݉ௌ௉ோ  , so that SPL and SPP consumers 
are safeguarded to the same extent against the possibility of excessive pricing by the USP. 
The Appendix summarises the calibration values of the demand and cost parameters and these 
retain the same calibration assumptions as in DRS for all aspects of the model, except the new SPP 
and SPL markets. 
  
i
(1 )I Ii L ia m d 
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2.7 Timing and decisions 
 
The model considers two periods, denoted by P1 and P2. All firms announce their prices for P1 at the 
beginning of P1. The regulator then announces details of the price constraints it will set during the 
next regulatory cycle, which is assumed to last five years, based on its assessment of prospects for 
mail demand and efficiency improvements. The regulator assesses the value of , which is the yearly 
percentage reduction in (both variable and fixed) costs the USP could be expected to attain, and sets 
the values of ݉ௌ௉ோ  and the BL access price constraint for the second regulatory cycle. Reductions in 
costs may arise from improvements in productivity or lower wage costs or a mix of both factors. The 
value of is assumed to be obtained from a rigorous efficiency review process undertaken in P1 that 
yields a challenging yet achievable estimate in P2.  
The USP then announces (in P1) efficiency targets to be achieved during the next regulatory 
cycle, but the value of it chooses need not equal that used by the regulator to set its price constraint.  
Moving on to P2,  it is assumed that the USP efficiency targets announced in P1 are achieved in 
P2 and, with a regulatory cycle of five years, USP costs decrease by 5  by the end of P2. For 
simplicity, competitors’ costs are assumed to be the same as in P1, such that can be interpreted as 
the amount by which the USP lowers its costs each year relative to competitors. At the same time, and 
independently from the variation in costs, market volumes of both operators are assumed to follow the 
same trend, with volumes varying by the same proportion for any given set of prices. This variation is 
given by the parameter  so that, for any given set of prices, mail volumes are % higher in P2 than 
in P1.2 Letter volumes are assumed to face a negative trend (λ=λL<0 due to e-substitution) while parcel 
volumes benefit from a positive trend (λ=λP>0, due to e-commerce).  
The USP then chooses prices for P2 to maximize profit in P2, subject to the price constraints set 
above, its costs (given its choice of ) and market demand during P2. Competitors post their prices for 
P2 simultaneously. 
 
3. Results from the Model: Single piece letters and parcels  
The operation of the model in the BL and CP markets adopts the same calibration assumptions as in 
DRS and hence the profit maximising prices and volumes for these segments are identical to their 
reported results3. Some of the key results in these markets are reported in Table 1 for ease of access. 
The discussion below instead focuses on the new dimension of the model, namely the disaggregation 
of single piece mail into SPL and SPP traffic streams. The calibration values for these sectors reflect 
broadly the characteristics of these markets in developed economies and further information is 
provided in the Appendix.     
The first column of results contains the base case calibration in P1, where the regulator is 
assumed to set price caps for the USP’s SPL and SPP services by some proportion above variable 
costs to allow the USP to earn a zero economic profit (that is, an accounting profit equal to 2.4bn€ to 
cover fixed costs and a normal rate of return) after taking into account the impact of competition in 
the BL, CP and SPP markets. With respect to the SPP market, it is assumed that parcel competitors to 
the USP compete for traffic by offering prices at a mark-up of 3% over their variable costs for a more 
restrictive service in terms of sender acceptance points relative to the USP. This latter point is 
captured in the model by cu (the additional cost borne by the sender when using a competitor SPP 
                                                            
2 So that, for instance, the demand function for SPL in P2 becomes ݔ௜ሺ݌ሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߣሻሺߙ െ ߚ݌ሻ. 
3 In particular, see the results for the USP and Competitor BL and CP volumes and prices contained in DRS 
Table 1, under the column headings “P1 no strike” and “P2 with 2% efficiency and no strike”. In both these 
cases competitors offer BL through access to the USP’s delivery network (rather than bypass) and the prices set 
by the USP satisfy the margin squeeze condition set by the regulator. 
e
e
e
e
e
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service instead of the USP) and set equal to 0.6 in P1. At the base case calibration values, the USP’s 
SPL price is 1.105€ which is equal to the maximum price allowed by the regulatory cap. However, 
due to the competitive nature of the SPP market the USP’s price of 5.636€ is below the price cap of 
6.63€ and competitor price of 6.00€ resulting in competitors capturing 21% of total SPP market 
volumes4.  
 Letter volumes are declining by significant amounts in most developed countries while parcel 
volumes are growing rapidly. In the numerical simulation, similar to DRS, it is assumed that the 
regulator expects letter volumes in P2 to decline by 20% over a five year period relative to P1 and 
parcel volumes to increase by 20% and, in the light of these assumptions, sets price controls for the 
USP in P1 that will allow it to earn a normal rate of profit in P2 if it achieves efficiency improvements 
of 2% per annum and avoids industrial action. The regulator monitors evolving trends in the parcels 
market and takes account of increasing competition in the SPP market where it expects competitors to 
expand their number of collection points making it easier for senders of low volume parcels to do 
business with them. This is captured in the model by a decline in cu from 0.6 in P1 to zero in P2, a 
value which the market could be expected to move towards over the longer term. The second column 
of results in Table 1contains the P2 profit maximising prices and volumes for the USP and competitors 
if the regulator’s assumptions made in P1 for P2 turn out to be correct. In this specific case, while 
increased competition in the SPP market results in a higher market share for competitors (from 20.8% 
in P1 to 28.8% in P2) the increase in the demand for parcels and improvement in USP efficiency levels 
allow the regulator to reduce the letter and parcel price caps in P2 so that the USP can still earn a 
normal rate of return (that is, an economic profit of zero). Similar to P1, the impact of competition in 
the SPP market results in the USP’s profit maximising price being lower than the SPP price cap (of 
5.557€).  
However, the future rarely turns out to be exactly as expected. The results reported in the third 
column refer to the situation where competition in the SPP market in P2 is somewhat higher than 
expected in P1,due to say parcel competitor access points to send SPP traffic exceeding those of the 
USP, and is modelled by reducing cu5 from zero to -1 in P2. The model results are directionally 
intuitive, such that when the USP faces higher levels of competition in the SPP market its profit 
maximising prices decline (from 5.201 to 4.674), parcel competitors gain market share (from 28.8% 
to 45.3%) and total market volumes increase (from 243m to 261m items). In this scenario, despite 
achieving its regulatory efficiency target of 2% per annum, the USP makes an economic loss of 
166m€ in P2 as it is prevented from raising SPL prices by the regulatory price cap which is binding 
(equal to 0.926).   
The final column of results in Table 1 refers to the situation where the USP is assumed to 
increase efficiency by 3% per annum without incurring any industrial action, which is 1% higher per 
year than the assumption adopted by the regulator to inform the price control it set in P1. In this case, 
the USP’s costs are lower which increases the contribution to profit from all segments of mail and 
also leads to lower profit maximising prices for its SPP traffic (declining from 5.201 to 5.141) with 
parcel competitors losing market share in this segment of the market (from 28.8% to 27.4%). The end 
                                                            
4 If the regulator had tried to set a lower cap on the SPL price so that caps on SPL and SPP had been equal and 
binding, it would have reduced the contribution the USP would be able to raise from SPL without changing that 
from SPP. A cap set at the profit-maximizing price for the USP’s SPP service would only produce the same 
level of contribution for it in the SPP market but such an outcome would lead to the USP making a negative 
profit overall due to the reduced contribution at that lower cap from SPL. 
5 Amending the competitor SPP user cost parameter is the most direct way to model the impact of increasing 
competition in the model. The directional effects of this change would be similar to shifting the parcel 
competitor switching function such that competitors were more competitive at all price points which might be 
due to say an upward shift in the quality of services provided by competitors at any given price.  
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result of the USP’s higher than expected efficiency performance in P2 is a positive economic profit of 
215m€.  
 
Table 1. Prices, volumes and economic profit under different conditions of competition and efficiency 
in the single piece parcel market  
 P1 with 
cu=0.6 
P2 with cu=0  
& e=2% p.a.  
P2 with cu=-1  
& e=2% p.a. 
P2 with cu=0  
& e=3% p.a.  
Prices, euro     
USP SPL 1.105 0.926 0.926 0.926 
USP SPP 5.636 5.201 4.674 5.141 
Parcel competitor SPP  6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 
All other prices as per DRS and not repeated here  
Volumes, billions of items     
Total across all markets 
(SPL,SPP,BL,CP) 
12.766 11.485 11.503 11.558 
USP SPL 1.581 1.336 1.336 1.336 
USP SPP 0.153 0.173 0.143 0.176 
Parcel competitor SPP (% market 
share in brackets)  
0.040 
(20.8%) 
0.070  
(28.8%) 
0.118  
(45.3%) 
0.066 
 (27.4%) 
Total SPP  0.193 0.243 0.261 0.243 
All other volumes (BL, CP jointly) 10.992 9.905 9.905 9.979 
USP economic profit net of fixed 
costs, billions of euro 
0 0 -0.166 0.215 
USP contribution to profit,  
 of which: 
2.400 2.160 1.994 2.255 
  USP contribution from SPL 1.114 0.756 0.756 0.783 
  USP contribution from SPP 0.497 0.526 0.360 0.547 
  USP contribution from BL, CP 0.790 0.878 0.878 0.925 
Net consumer surplus (SPL) 2.620 2.329 2.329 2.329 
Note that P1 and P2 refer to the last year of a five year regulatory cycle.   
 
The relationship between SPL and SPP price caps and increasing levels of competition in the SPP 
market in P2 is examined further in Figure 1 assuming both BL and CP markets remain as in the base. 
This plots the level of the SPP price cap required to generate zero economic profit for different 
degrees of competition in the SPP market (represented in the model by the sender user cost parameter, 
cu) and also plots the USP’s SPL price cap and profit-maximising SPP price after normalising them to 
equal unity in the P2 base case where cu equals zero. Table 1 reported these prices for just two states 
of competition in the SPP market (where cu was equal to 0 and -1). The schedules for both the SPL 
and SPP price caps are approximately linear6 and slope downwards to reflect the need for higher 
prices to counter-balance the increasing loss in contribution from SPP traffic at higher levels of 
competition in this segment of the market.  
The profit maximising prices set by the USP in Figure 1 result in the SPL price cap schedule 
always acting as a binding constraint in our calibrated model while the SPP price cap does not. In the 
latter case, where competition in the SPP market is low the parcels price cap is binding but when 
competition increases beyond a certain point the profit maximising price charged by the USP falls 
below the price cap. With our calibration, this switching occurs when the user cost value is below 
about 0.3 and, in general, the USP’s SPP price is the lower of the regulated price cap and its profit-
maximising price. An important point to note from this analysis is that the greater is the intensity of 
                                                            
6 This is due, among others, to assuming that the regulator adopts an equi‐proportional mark‐up rule in setting 
caps to derive a zero economic profit.  
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competition in the SPP market, the lower are both the profit-maximising SPP price and the 
contribution of the SPP market to the USP’s profit. This in turn requires the regulator to raise the SPL 
price cap to allow the USP to earn a zero economic profit. For example, with regards to the 166m€ 
loss in profit reported in Table 1 (penultimate column), due to competition in the SPP market in P2 
being greater than the regulator expected in P1, this loss could potentially be offset by raising the SPL 
price cap from 0.926 to 1.085 in P2. 
 
Figure 1. USP prices in P2 at break-even under different degrees of competition  
in the SPP market (e=2%)  
 
 
4. Sensitivities  
This section considers the impact of additional sensitivities to our calibrated model assumptions. In 
each case, the sensitivity impact refers to a change in the USP’s economic profit in P2 relative to the 
base case reported in Table 1 (second column of results).The sensitivities undertaken focus on four 
different types of unexpected external shocks that could impact the USPs financial position and they 
are reported in Table 2. The first three assume only one of the calibrated model assumptions change 
while all others remain the same as in the base case. However, in the fourth sensitivity the USP is 
allowed the option to respond to a negative shock by adjusting its efficiency target to try and protect 
its financial position but in doing so raises the risk of industrial action taking place.  
The first two sensitivities examine the impact of unexpected declines in mail volumes due to 
external factors. In the first, letter volumes are assumed to be 10% lower in P2 (and so 30% below 
their level in P1) due to, say, increasing e-substitution. In this sensitivity, prices and volumes remain 
unchanged in all segments of the parcels market, as do bulk letter prices. Furthermore, since the SPL 
price in the base case is at the maximum allowable under the price cap set for P2 in P1 the USP is 
prevented from raising SPL prices to offset the impact of lower letter demand and this results in a loss 
of economic profit of 134m€. Note that if the regulator had expected letter volumes to decline by 30% 
rather than 20%, then given the price inelastic nature of SPL traffic it would have been necessary to 
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set a higher letter price cap to allow the USP to breakeven, but as a result senders of SPL mail would 
suffer a loss of net consumer surplus due to the higher SPL price. The second sensitivity assumes 
parcel volumes unexpectedly outturn at 10% higher in P2 as opposed to the 20% increase assumed by 
the USP and regulator. This has no effect on the SPL or BL markets in our model. Furthermore, the 
downward shift in demand for parcels does not impact profit-maximising prices for either of the SPP 
or CP segments. However, the decline in parcel volumes results in a lower contribution to profit 
compared to the base case, resulting in a 91m€ loss in P2. Both these sensitivities indicate that 
uncertainty associated with the demand for mail can have a substantial impact on the USP’s financial 
position. In terms of addressing such challenges there is no simple regulatory solution, although 
aspects of setting price caps in an environment where a range of factors might impact on the 
appropriate level of caps have been explored by Brennan and Crew (2016).  
The third sensitivity assumes that stricter labour legislation, or adherence to existing legislation, 
results in parcel competitor costs being 5% higher in P2 than the USP or regulator anticipated when 
the price cap was set in P1. Higher parcel competitor costs are assumed to feed directly through to 
their prices, as they are simply a mark-up over costs. In this environment, the USP’s profit-
maximising solution is to simultaneously raise prices a little and win more parcel volumes, both of 
which contribute to increasing profit by 163m€ in P2 relative to the base case.7   
In the fourth sensitivity it is assumed that competition in the SPP market is higher than the 
regulator expected and, as in Section 3, this is examined by lowering the SPP user cost value to -1. In 
the absence of any response from the USP and no strike action taking place, its economic profit would 
decline by 166m€ (see Table 1, third column of results). However, financial pressures, especially for 
privatised USPs, are likely to incentivise them to respond and implement operational efficiency 
initiatives faster than they would otherwise have targeted. In such a scenario the USP would be forced 
to balance the competing pressures of incurring an economic loss and offsetting this by pressing for 
higher efficiency gains that could lead to costly strike action taking place. For example, the results  
 
Table 2: Sensitivities to assumptions and USP changes to economic profit in P2 relative to the base case 
with sender user cost equal to zero 
Changes in assumptions relative to base case Change in economic profit in P2, €bnsb 
1 Letter volumes lower by 10% in P2  a -0.134 
2 Parcel volumes lower by 10% in P2  a -0.091 
3 Parcel competitor costs increase by 5% in P2  0.163 
4 Competition in the SPP market is more intensive, such that cu=-1, and the USP responds by:  
  No strike case Strike case 
a 
 
USP raises its efficiency target to 2.8% and increases the risk of 
industrial action occurring c 
0.003 -0.460 
b USP maintains its original 2% efficiency target and does not 
increase the risk of industrial action occurring c -0.166 -0.516 
Notes: 
a  Changes affecting volumes are approximately symmetric in the opposite direction. 
b  Figures refer to P2 which is the final year of a five year regulatory cycle and are not comparable with the results 
in Table 2 of DRS which contain present value estimates covering six years (the final year of the previous 
regulatory cycle, P1, and the five years of the following cycle to P2).  
c The assumptions underpinning the cost of a strike occurring in P2 are similar to those contained in DRS, see page 
244. However, note that the strike in this sensitivity occurs in P2 in contrast to the assumptions contained in DRS 
which assume it takes place in P1.  
 
                                                            
7 Note that the increase in parcel prices in the SPP market occurs as a result of the price cap not binding in our 
calibrated model. If it were to this would constrain the USP’s price and only volumes would adjust.    
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reported in sensitivity 4a suggest that if the USP could achieve a higher level of efficiency of say 
2.8%, compared to the base case of 2%, and avoid a strike in P2 it could avoid a financial loss and 
achieve a zero economic profit. However, the results also show that if a strike were to occur and the 
assumptions concerning the loss in USP traffic following a strike in P2 were similar to those contained 
in DRS, as described in the Appendix, then this would lead to a substantial loss in P2 of  460m€. Note 
that, as the results reported in sensitivity 4b indicate, this loss would be somewhat lower than the 
516m€ loss the USP would suffer if it maintained its original efficiency target of 2% pa, although it is 
likely that the risk of a strike would be higher when targeting efficiency gains of 2.8% pa. 
 
5. Conclusions  
The increase in on-line shopping and demand for parcels has provided postal USPs with a much 
needed boost to counter balance some of the challenges they are confronting with respect to declining 
letter volumes. However, as parcel markets have expanded and evolved to meet changes in consumer 
patterns it brings forward new threats as well as opportunities for USPs. In particular, while 
competition is intense in some domestic bulk contract parcel markets in Europe, USPs face the threat 
of increasing competition for single piece (or non-contract) parcel traffic, especially from competitors 
that may potentially be operating at the margin of regulatory requirements. 
This paper extends the model developed by De Donder et al. (2018) to examine the impact of 
increasing competition in the single piece parcel (SPP) market. The model structure and assumptions 
consist of a number of key elements. First letter volumes are in long term decline due to e-
substitution. Second the USP is required to meet a pre-specified USO but competitors are not required 
to do so. Third the USP is subject to price controls set by a regulator. Fourth, fixed costs are inherent 
in meeting the USO.  
 Similar to De Donder et al., the model assumes that the regulator sets a price control structure 
that requires the USP to achieve a specific rate of efficiency if a number of market conditions hold 
during the price control period for the USP to earn a zero economic profit. The model assumes that 
the USP maximises profit subject to the regulatory constraints and the external environment it 
operates within, which may differ from those assumed by the regulator when setting price caps for 
single piece letters (SPL) and SPP. However, the future rarely turns out as expected and the paper 
explores the impact of a number of unexpected events using sensitivity analysis to provide some 
important insights. In particular, these show that if competition in the SPP market turns out to be 
greater than expected at the time of setting regulatory price caps this could potentially lead the USP to 
incur a significant financial cost if it was unable to sufficiently increase the pace of its operational 
efficiency program to counterbalance this or if, as a result of trying to achieve these efficiency 
savings, it triggered costly strike action.  
Our results also show that increasing competition in the SPP market implies higher price caps 
be set for SPL and possibly also for SPP although the latter may not always be binding if there is 
sufficient competition in the SPP market.  
The paper models a number of other sensitivities resulting from unexpected shocks, including 
lower levels of demand for letters and parcels, higher parcel competitor costs resulting from changes 
in labour regulations (or stricter adherence to existing legislation) and higher efficiency levels while 
avoiding strike action. The direction of movement in the USP’s financial position resulting from these 
sensitivities is consistent with what economic theory would expect. Furthermore, to a first 
approximation the individual sensitivities are symmetric in terms of their direction of movement and 
broadly additive which, to some extent, allows these to be combined numerically. 
A key point to note from these sensitivities is that a range of plausible external shocks could 
have a substantial impact on the USP’s financial position, even if it were to deliver its efficiency 
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targets, and that fixed pre-determined single piece price caps could impose a significant constraint on 
the USP’s ability to achieve a normal rate of economic profit. Aspects of setting price caps in an 
environment where a range of factors might impact on the appropriate level of caps have been 
addressed in recent literature (Brennan and Crew, 2016). The current paper has highlighted the 
importance of allowing for a number of such factors, and the uncertainty inherent in many of them, in 
setting a framework which is able to underpin the financial sustainability of universal service.     
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
1) Calibration for simulations  
(A) Demand. For SPL, BL, SPP and CP markets, when the retail price of the good considered is the 
same in both zones, the urban zone represents 80% of total volumes, and the rural zone 20%.  
SPL market: at a price of p=0.667€, total volume of 1.8bn items, and direct price elasticity of demand 
of -0.2. 
SPP market: hypothetical monopoly setting: at a price of ݌ௌ௉ூ ൌ 4, demand price elasticity of -0.2 (in 
both zones), and total volume of 0.2 billion items. With competition, displacement ratio 
ൣ߲ݔܵܲ,݅ܫ ൫݌ܵܲܫ , ݌ܵܲܧ ൅ ܿݑ൯ ߲݌ܵܲܧൗ ൧ ൣ߲ݔܵܲ,݅ܧ ൫݌ܵܲܫ , ݌ܵܲܧ ൅ ܿݑ൯ ߲݌ܵܲܧൗ ൧ൗ ൌ 0.75. USP market share of 70% 
when ݌ௌ௉ூ ൌ ݌ௌ௉ா ൌ 6 and cu=0.6 and of 90% when ݌ௌ௉ூ ൌ 6, ݌ௌ௉ா ൌ 6.6 and cu=0.6. 
BL market: hypothetical monopoly setting: at a price of 0.4, demand price elasticity of -0.4 (in both 
zones), and total volume of 7.5 billion items. With competition, displacement ratio 
of 0.9. Market share of 25% for competitors when 
 and of 50% when  and   
CP market: assuming that the USP price in the urban (resp., rural) area is 1.9 (resp., 2.4) and that 
competitors are 10% more expensive than the USP, demands are calibrated so that (i) the 
displacement ratio is 0.75, (ii) the demand price elasticity is -0.2, (iii) the USP volume is 0.4 (resp., 
0.1), (iv) the USP’s market share is 35%. For equal USP and competitors’ prices, the USP’s market 
share is 10%.  
(B) Costs (in P1).  
SPL market: unit variable cost  of 0.38 in urban area (i=U) and 0.48 in rural area (i=R).  
SPP market: unit variable costs: ܿௌ௉,௎ூ ൌ 2.28 , ܿௌ௉,ோூ ൌ 2.88 , ܿௌ௉,௎ா ൌ ܿௌ௉,ோா ൌ 5.83.  
BL market: same upstream variable cost in both zones for both operators: =0.02. 
Upstream preparation cost of the USP’s BL final customers: =0.15. USP’s downstream cost: 
=0.19 and =0.34. Competitors’ downstream cost: =0.28 and =0.74.  
CP market: unit variable costs: =1.14, =1.44, =2, =2.6.  
USP: fixed cost of F=2.4. All (variable and fixed) USP costs decrease by 5e% between P1 and P2. 
(C) Mark-ups. USP mark-up for access charge set by the regulator:  and ϕ=2/3. 
Competitors’ mark-up in BL market: ; in SPP market:݉ௌ௉ ൌ 0.03 ; and in CP market: 
.  
(D) Exogenous variations in volumes. Exogenous volume trend between P1 and P2 for letters are  
ߣ௅ ൌ െ0.2 and for parcels ߣ௉ ൌ 0.2.  
( , ) / / ( , ) /I I E E E I E Ei i I i i i I iy q q q y q q q          
= = 0.4I Ei iq q = 0.4
I
iq = 0.36.
E
iq
ic
=I E I EU U R Rb b b b 
pb IUd
I
Rd
E
Ud
E
Rd
I
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I
Rf
E
Uf
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= 0.1ILm
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If a strike occurs in P2 (see sensitivities 4a and 4b in Table 2), USP volumes are assumed to decrease 
by a fraction ߛ௅ሺ݁ሻ in the (single-piece and bulk) letter markets, and by ߛ௉ሺ݁ሻ in the (single-piece and 
contract) parcels markets. The functions ߛ௅ and ߛ௉ are both increasing in , as the announcement of a 
larger decrease in costs is likely to result in more severe industrial action. In particular, the volume 
loss by the USP in the case of a strike in P2 as a proportion of the USP’s pre-strike volume is equal to 
ߛ௅ሺ݁ሻ ൌ 0.04 ൅ 4݁ and ߛ௉ሺ݁ሻ ൌ 0.08 ൅ 8݁ , where is expressed as a proportion (for example,  = 
2% as  = 0.02). Competitors’ volumes are similarly affected in the BL market (since the USP 
delivers these volumes on the competitors’ behalf, at equilibrium). As for the (single-piece and 
contract) parcels markets, a fraction β=0.8 of the volumes assumed to be lost by the USP due to the 
strike is diverted towards the competitors. So, for instance, in the CP market, USP demand when a 
strike occurs in P2 becomes ሺ1 ൅ ߣ௉ሻ൫1 െ ߛ௉ሺ݁ሻ൯ݖ௜ூሺݏ௜ூ, ݏ௜ாሻ while the competitors’ demand becomes 
ሺ1 ൅ ߣ௉ሻ ቀݖ௜ா൫ݏ௜ூ, ݏ௜ா൯ ൅ ߚߛ௉ሺ݁ሻݖ௜ூ൫ݏ௜ூ, ݏ௜ா൯ቁ 
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